The problem of exact-repair regenerating codes against eavesdropping attack is studied. The eavesdropping model we consider is that the eavesdropper has the capability to observe the data involved in the repair of a subset of nodes. An (n, k, d, ) secure exact-repair regenerating code is an (n, k, d) exact-repair regenerating code that is secure under this eavesdropping model. It has been shown that for some parameters (n, k, d, ) , the associated optimal storage-bandwidth tradeoff curve, which has one corner point, can be determined. The focus of this paper is on characterizing such parameters. We establish a lower bound on the number of wiretap nodes, and show that this bound is tight for the case k = d = n − 1.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed storage systems (DSSs) have been widely researched because of the rapid growth in applications such as data center and cloud network. For data reliability, some redundancy must be added to the system. In the pioneering study [1] , Dimakis et al. introduced a new class of codes called regenerating codes, which substantially reduce the amount of data that need to be downloaded during the repair process. In [1] , a fundamental tradeoff between the amount of data stored in each node and the repair bandwidth was shown under the notion of functional repair, where the new replacement nodes only maintain the reconstruction property, that is, any k out of n nodes can reconstruct the file but do not maintain an exact copy of the failed node. On the other hand, under the notion of exact repair introduced in [2] , the replacement node is required to recover exactly the same content that was stored in the failed node. However, a full characterization of the storage-bandwidth tradeoff curve of exact-repair regenerating codes appears to be more difficult and still remains open, and many attempts have been made along this line [3] - [10] .
In this paper, we consider the problem of exact-repair regenerating codes with an additional security requirement. Information-theoretically secure regenerating codes were first introduced by Pawar et al. [11] , in which they provided an upper bound on the maximum amount of information that can be securely stored in a system. Secure exact-repair regenerating codes at two extreme points, namely, the minimum bandwidth regenerating (MBR) and minimum storage regenerating (MSR) points, have been intensively studied in [11] - [14] . On the other hand, the optimal storage-bandwidth tradeoff curve under secure repair constraint has been studied in [15] - [19] . In particular, the results in [17] , [18] showed that the MBR point is the only corner point of the optimal storage-bandwidth tradeoff curve (or simply tradeoff curve) for some parameters (n, k, d, ), which contrasts sharply with the problem without the security constraint. Owing to a structural property of the tradeoff curve, if it has a single corner point, then it is completely characterized by that single point. Thus for the aforementioned cases investigated in [17] , [18] , the tradeoff curve is completely characterized by the MBR point. Subsequently, Shao et al. [19] found the first case where the optimal storage-bandwidth tradeoff curve has multiple corner points, and obtained a sufficient condition on the number of wiretap nodes where the rate region can be determined by a single corner point. In this paper, we establish a lower bound on the number of wiretap nodes, such that the optimal storagebandwidth tradeoff curve has a single corner point if ≥. In particular, the lower bound for the case k = d = n − 1 is tight, which means that the optimal storage-bandwidth tradeoff curve has a single corner point if and only if ≥.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the formulation of the problem. The main results are presented in Section III, and the proof will be given in Section IV and Section V. We conclude the paper in Section VI. The file M can be reconstructed by accessing to any k nodes. When node i fails, the data on the failed node can be regenerated by download data from any other d nodes. All information transmitted during the repair process of nodes can be wiretapped by an eavesdropper.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND KNOWN RESULTS
Following the setting in [1] , we assume that there is a secure distributed storage system consisting of n active storage nodes N := {1, 2, . . . , n} for storing a file F of B s message symbols, and each node can store α symbols. When a node fails, a new replacement node with the same storage capacity α connects to any d (≥ k) nodes chosen from the remaining n − 1 nodes and downloads β symbols from each of them to regenerate the failed node. Moreover, any legitimate data collector can reconstruct the original file by connecting to any k of the n active nodes. We assume that there exists an eavesdropper Eve who is able to observe the repair data for a subset of nodes with cardinality (< k). It not only can observe the information stored in node i but also all the data transmitted from the other d helper nodes to repair the node i when it fails.
Let M be the uniformly distributed random variable representing the file to be stored in the system. The support set of M is denoted by M, and B s is used to denote the entropy of the message variable, i.e., B s = H (M). Let Z be a random variable independent on the message variable M, called the key, that takes value in an alphabet Z according to the uniform distribution. As illustrated in Fig. 1 , we assume that the message and key are generated at an auxiliary source node and are directly available to all storage nodes in the system. For i ∈ N , let W i denote the data stored in the i -th node. Next, we formally define a secure distributed storage system based on an exact-repair regenerating code. In the rest of the paper, when we refer to a secure distributed storage system, we always assume that it is based on an exact-repair regenerating code. Definition 1. An (n, k, d, ) secure distributed storage system (SDSS) based on an exact-repair regenerating code consists of a set of encoding functions and decoding functions (F, G, , ), which can be described as follows.
• Message encoding functions: F = { f i : i ∈ N } is a collection of message encoding functions, where f i maps the message and key to the information stored in the i -th node,
It maps the coded information stored in nodes {i, i ∈ K} to the message. • Repair encoding functions:
maps the coded information in node i to the information transmitted for repairing node j for a given choice of helper nodes set D. • Repair decoding functions: = {ψ j,D : j ∈ N , D ⊆ N \{ j }, |D| = d} consists of n n−1 d repair decoding functions, where ψ j,D : S D → W maps the information from a set D of help nodes to the information stored in the failed node.
An (n, k, d, ) secure distributed storage system is required to satisfy the following criteria:
• (Reconstruction property) the file can be retrieved from the contents stored in any k out of n storage nodes:
where W K is defined as W K := {W i : i ∈ K}. • (Regeneration property) any d out of n − 1 nodes can repair the failed j -th node:
(3)
Any collection of encoding and decoding functions (F, G, , ) satisfying all these three criteria will naturally induce a secure exact-repair regenerating code associated with the triple (B s , α, β). We can always assume that B s > 0 because otherwise the code can not be used for storing any information. Under this assumption, we can define the normalized pair (ᾱ,β) byᾱ
A normalized pair (ᾱ,β) is also called an operating point. We may use "the pair" or "the point" interchangeably in the following sections. With the normalized pair (ᾱ,β), we introduce the following definition. It follows directly from the definition that if the pair (ᾱ,β) is achievable, then any pair (ᾱ + δ 1 ,β + δ 2 ) is also achievable, where δ 1 , δ 2 ≥ 0. Thus, the achievable region can be fully characterized if and only if the boundary is known. To be consistent with the terminology in the literature, we call the collection of points on the boundary the storage-bandwidth tradeoff curve. For a given (n, k, d, ) secure distributed storage system, its secrecy capacity is defined as the maximum file size C s (α, β) that can be stored in the system such that
Clearly, determining the secrecy capacity for any given α and β is equivalent to characterizing the storage-bandwidth tradeoff curve. In [12] , the following point is proved to be achievable for any (n, k, d, )-SDSS:
where k,d, :
An interesting finding in [17] and [18] is that for some cases, the storage-bandwidth tradeoff curve under the security condition is completely characterized by the single corner point specified in (6) , i.e., the achievable rate region is given exactly by
Subsequently in [19] , the first case that the storage-bandwidth tradeoff curve has multiple corner points was found, and a sufficient condition for the number of wiretap nodes was given for the storage-bandwidth tradeoff curve of an SDSS to have a single corner point. In this paper, we will focus on finding parameters (n, k, d, ) such that the tradeoff curve has this behavior. Fig. 2 illustrates the optimal storage-bandwidth The solid line is the storage-bandwidth tradeoff curve for (7, 6, 6, 1), which has two corner points (3/8, 1/8) and (2/5, 1/15). The dashed line is the storage-bandwidth tradeoff curve for (7, 6, 6, 2) , which has a single corner point (6/10, 1/10).
tradeoff curve for (7, 6, 6, 1) and (7, 6, 6, 2) , which has one and two corner points, respectively.
Remark. We will prove in Appendix A that the point as defined in (6) must be on the optimal tradeoff curve. Therefore, if the optimal tradeoff curve has only one corner point, then it must be (α,β).
In this paper, we focus on the case n = d + 1. After presenting the main results, we will discuss the case n > d +1 and extend part of the results to the case n > d + 1. We will invoke the setting n = d + 1 from time to time without explicitly mentioning it in the following sections. Under this setting, we can largely simplify the aforementioned notations. When repairing the failed node, all the remaining nodes are helper nodes. Therefore we can drop D in the notations S j i (D) and S j (D). Specifically, we will write S j i (D) as S j i and write S j (D) as S j because D = N \{ j } is implicit. Denote S L := {S j : j ∈ L}, and obviously S L is identical to Y L . Then, the regeneration property can be written as
Similarly, we can rewrite the security condition as
We follow the discussion for symmetrical regenerating codes in [3] . A code is said to be a entropy-symmetrical regenerating code (or simply symmetrical regenerating code) if for any X A ⊆ W ∪S and any permutation π on N , we have
It has been shown in [18] that assuming that the secure exactrepair regenerating code is symmetrical does not incur any loss of generality when we consider R n,k,d, . Therefore, we may invoke this symmetrical assumption in our argument without explicitly mentioning it. Under this setting, we can let H (W i ) = α and H (S j i ) = β. For notational simplicity, let us define
Remark. Since (k, d, = 0) / ∈ P for k ≥ 2 and (k = 1, d, = 0) ∈ P (which can be seen by considering the repetition code), we assume that ≥ 1 in this paper, so we will invoke the setting d − 1 ≥ k − 1 ≥ ≥ 1 from time to time without explicitly mentioning it.
It was first shown that (k, d, ) ∈ P for d ≤ 4 in [17] and [18] . Subsequently, Shao et al. [19] showed that (k, d, ) ∈ P for ≥ * := min{ ≥ 1 : k,d, ≤ d + √ d}. In this paper, we will give a lower bound such that (k, d, ) ∈ P for ≥, which subsumes all the previous related results [16] - [19] . Moreover, the given lower bound is tight for k = d, which means that (k, d, ) ∈ P if and only if ≥.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We first present the main results of this paper, and discuss some consequences of the results. The main results of this paper are as follows:
1) For k = d, we establish a threshold in the following theorem for the number of wiretap nodes for those systems whose optimal tradeoff curve has a single corner. Theorem 1. For any fixed d, the triple (k = d, d, ) ∈ P if and only if ≥ := 1 4 (d − 1). 2) For k < d, we obtain a lower bound on the number of wiretap nodes for this single corner point behavior, which is stated in the following theorem.
The two theorems are established under the assumption n = d + 1. In particular, we can prove the two outer boundsᾱ ≥α andβ ≥β for any (n = d + 1, k, d, ) such that (k, d, ) satisfies the conditions given in two theorems, i.e., ≥ 1 4 (d − 1) for k = d or (11) for k < d. Now, we claim that these two outer bounds also holds for any (n, k, d, ) such that n > d +1 if (k, d, ) satisfies the same conditions. The reason is that any (n, k, d, ) system contains an (n = d + 1, k, d, ) subsystem, and the sub-system must satisfy the same outer bounds α ≥α andβ ≥β, which are naturally valid outer bounds for (n, k, d, ).
Note thatα andβ are independent of n (recall thatα = dβ = d/ k i=+1 (d + 1 − i )), and we know from [12] that (α,β) is achievable for any (n, k, d, ). Hence, we know that R n,k,d, = {(ᾱ,β) :ᾱ ≥α,β ≥β} if (k, d, ) satisfies the conditions in Theorem 1 or Theorem 2. In other words, if (k, d, ) ∈ P, that is the optimal tradeoff curve for (n = d +1, k, d, ) has a single corner point, then the optimal tradeoff curve for (n, k, d, ) also has a single corner point. This is stated in the following corollary.
Before proceeding to the proof, we first discuss some consequences of the theorems, and compare with the best known results in [19] .
1) It was shown in [19] that if ≥ * = ( √ d − 1) 2 , then (k = d, d, ) ∈ P. We can see that when d is large, * goes to d. However, Theorem 1 indicates that the threshold is strictly bounded away from d, and when d is large, ≈ * /4. Thus, our bound not only is a significant improvement over the previous bound but also tight.
2) Though the formula in (11) is complicated, we can show that if (k, d, ) ∈ P, then (k, d, + 1) ∈ P. In other words, for any fixed k and d, there exists a lower bound such that (k, d, ) ∈ P for ≥. Also, we can show that for any k and d, the lower bound induced from Theorem 2 supersedes the result in [19] , that is,
See details in Appendix B. Instead of presenting details here, we give an example to illustrate the gap between in Theorem 2 and * in [19] . Example 1. Consider the example d = 32 and k = 31. We can check that the first case in (11) is satisfied for = 12, but is not satisfied for = 11, so we obtain = 12. Also, by substituting by substituting k = 31 and d = 32 in * , we have * = min ≥ 1 :
Since the condition 1 2 (31 − )(34 − ) ≤ 32 + √ 32 is satisfied for = 22 but not for = 21, we obtain * = 22. Therefore, we can see that there is a gap between and * , and this gap can be large. To facilitate our discussion, we have some preparations. First, consider any subset T of W ∪ S such that H (W K | T ) = 0. Then by the reconstruction property (1) and security constraint (9), we can obtain an upper bound on B s as follows:
By letting T = S j i : j < i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ k and L = {1, . . . , }, we can obtain the upper bound in [11] :
which can also be written asβ ≥β. Sinceβ ≥β and (α,β) ∈ R n,k,d, for any (n, k, d, )-SDSS, the triple (k, d, ) ∈ P if and only ifᾱ ≥α, or equivalently
Therefore, we will prove that B s ≤ k,d, d α for ≥ for both theorems to conclude that (k, d, ) ∈ P for ≥. On the other hand, to prove the 'only if' part of Theorem 1, we will show that if <, then there exists one achievable point (ᾱ,β) such thatᾱ <α, which implies that (k, d, ) / ∈ P. Since Han's inequality together with the symmetry will be invoked in following sections from time to time, we introduce a set of problem-specific inequalities stated in the next lemma by slightly modifying the well-known Han's inequality in [20] (see also [21, p.47] ).
Then we have
Proof. The lemma can be obtained directly by invoking the symmetry in Han's inequality as follows:
where (a) follows because of the symmetry and (b) follows from Han's inequality.
Remark. The lemma still holds if h r is defined by
, so we may also apply
in the following sections. Since the proof is exactly the same, we omit the details here.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we will invoke the setting k = d = n − 1 from time to time without explicitly mentioning it. Before presenting the details, we first outline the proof.
In Subsection IV-A, we will show that if <, then there exists one achievable point (ᾱ,β) such thatᾱ <α, which implies that (k, d, ) / ∈ P. The proof of the achievability of this point is largely borrowed from a code construction in [9] .
To prove that (k, d, ) ∈ P for ≥, we only need to show (14) for ≥. By letting T = W [k] and L = {1, . . . , } in (12) , we see that the secrecy capacity B s is upper bounded by
Thus, it is sufficient for us to prove that
for ≥. This will be proved by induction on in Subsection IV-B.
We first roughly review the code construction for (n, k, d, = 0) exact-repair regenerating codes with k = d = n−1 in [9] , where the code construction is based on duplicated combination block design. Considering a block design over the domain (node index) N = {1, . . . , n}, the design there can be viewed as an exhaustive list of all r -combinations (n ≥ r ) of N . Each block forms a (r, r − 1) erasure code, and symbols in different blocks are independent.
In particular, we consider block size r = 3 in this subsection. We have a design C(r, n)
be independent random variables uniformly on a sufficient large field F, and we consider a corresponding vector for each B i such that
Then, the encoding is as the following:
Let X i and X j (Y i and Y j ) be independent random variables for i = j . We can see that in this construction,
See more details in [9] . Therefore, following the same argument in [22] , we know that there exists an (n, k = n − 1, d = n − 1, ) secure exactrepair regenerating code with α = n−1
if the field size is large enough, and so
If an integer satisfying that < = 1 4 (d − 1) , we have < 1 4 (d − 1) = 1 4 (n − 2). As such, we havē
Therefore, we know that if <, there exists one achievable point
In this subsection, we will show that
Proof. Since k = d, W [k] can determine any subsets of W ∪S , and so H
The following lemma gives a class of upper bounds on
H W [+1:k] |S [] .
Lemma 3. For any
for any t = 0, . . . , − 1.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Since ≥ 1, there always exists an upper bound on
n is regarded as a constant. For notational simplicity, denote the right-hand side of (17) by f (d, , t), where t = 0, . . . , − 1. Then the following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 2. For any
and μ t ≥ 0, t = 0, . . . , − 1.
With these preparations, we start to prove that
for ≥ by induction on .
First, for the base case =, (19) becomes
From Proposition 2, we know that
for any μ satisfying
and
Clearly, the chosen coefficients should induce the upper bound
Note
cancel with each other, as the upper bound should only be related to α. In particular, we can let
We first verify that for this choice of μ, both (21) and (22) are satisfied in the following proposition. (23) and
Proof. See Appendix D-A.
It remains to show that
Towards this end, consider
where in the last step we replace i by t + 1 and t by j . By letting
We separately discuss the case = 1 here. When = 1, clearly we have μ 0 = 1, and then (25) becomes
= 1, we know that n ≤ 6, and then we have
We have completed the proof for = 1.
For ≥ 2, (25) can be written aŝ
(26)
Since
where (a) follows from the symmetry, we can further bound (26) as follows:
where (a) follows from c −1 = 0, and (b) follows because c 0 ≥ 0 and H S 1 ≤ dβ. By letting
Proof. See Appendix D-C.
From Proposition 5, we obtain
Finally, we can substantiate that
where (a) follows from dβ ≥ α. Therefore, the base case holds, that is,
Now, we start the inductive step to show that for any
for some ≥ + 1.
Then, consider
where (a) follows from Proposition 1, and (b) follows from (28). Also, we have 
Proof. The lemma can be proved by modifying the proof of Lemma 3. See details in Appendix E.
We now have three upper bounds on
. Similar to what we did in the previous subsection, we will take a particular convex combination of (29), (30) and (31) 
Hence, by letting v 2 = 1 and v 1 = v 3 = 0, we obtain that
.
where (a) follows from Lemma 2 and v 2 − v 3 2 ≥ 0 for ≥ 1, and (b) can be justified by substituting v 2 and v 3 .
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 2

A. Our Approach
By letting K = [k] and L = [] in (12) , we obtain that for any given d, k and , the secrecy capacity B s is upper bounded by
for any T such that H W [k] |T = 0. Similar to what we did in the last section, we will select T in different ways to obtain a number of upper bounds on B s , and then take a convex combination of them to derive an upper bound that depends only on α. Consider any set of variables T = {S [] } ∪ {X y : y = + 1, . . . , k}, where X y can either be W y or S y . Then
We can use a (k − )-length binary vector q := (q +1 , . . . , q k ) to represent the choices of X y , 
where
The 
(36) for t y = , . . . , y − 1, and
Proof. See Appendix F.
By combining (32), (34), (36) and (37), we can obtain an upper bound on B s for any given q. By examining (36) and (37), we see that the right-hand sides of them may contain the terms α, H S j |S [ j −1] for j = , . . . , k, and H S
[ j ] n for j = , . . . , k − 1. Hence, let us specify the mapping f from any (k − )-length binary vector to the corresponding upper bound, which can be written as
where ν j and μ j can be determined by the given q. Note that from (37) we know that the coefficient of α can be determined by the sum of the coefficients of H S
[ j ] n for j = , . . . , k−1. Furthermore, we consider an m × (k − ) binary matrix
where each q x , 1 ≤ x ≤ m is some binary row vector defined in (33), and the first column of Q is labeled by the index + 1 for consistency. The parameter t y (cf. (35)) in Lemma 5 corresponding to the row q x , where 1 ≤ x ≤ m, is given by
For each q x , we can obtain from (38) the upper bound
With a slight abuse of notations, we write
It is clear that f (Q) is an upper bound on m B s . By dividing m on both sides of (41), we have
Clearly, for any (k, d, ) , then (k, d, ) ∈ P. Now, we claim that if the following three conditions
are satisfied, wherē
then right hand side of (42) is upper bounded by
To see this, focus on the right hand side of (42). By recalling from (27) that
where (a) follows from (43) and (b) follows from (44). Since
where in (c), the indices i and j in the double summation are renamed as j and i , respectively, we obtain
where (d) follows from Lemma 2.
where (e) follows from (45) and (f) follows from Lemma 2.
Proof. See Appendix G.
We can see easily that 1 m f (Q) is upper bounded by k,d, d α from (47) and Proposition 7. Therefore, we have shown that for any (k, d, ) , if there exists a matrix Q such that f (Q) satisfies (43), (44) and (45), then (k, d, ) ∈ P.
B. Specification of the Matrix Q
From the previous discussion, we know that for any (k, d, ) , if there exists a matrix Q such that f (Q) satisfies (43), (44) and (45), then (k, d, ) ∈ P. In this subsection, we will show the existence of a qualified matrix Q for each (k, d, ) ∈ P s . In particular, we consider Q satisfying the following conditions: 1) If q x,y = 0, then q x ,y = 0 for all x ≤ x; 2) If q x,y = 0, then q x,y = 0 for all y ≤ y. These conditions say that the zeros and ones in the matrix Q exhibit an echelon form.
Any matrix satisfying two conditions can be uniquely represented by a set of rational numbers z j : j = + 1, . . . , k such that 0 ≤ z j ≤ 1 and z i ≤ z j if i ≥ j , where mz j corresponds to the number of zeros in the j -th column. Now, for any (k, d, ) , let Note that when = k − 1, we have
(49) It is easy to see that 0 ≤ z j ≤ 1 for all j , so we only need to verify that z i ≤ z j if i ≥ j . Obviously, we only need to consider ≤ k − 2. Then we have
Next, let us discuss the two cases 2d − k − + 1 ≤ d and 2d − k − + 1 > d as follows. 1) If 2d − k − + 1 ≤ d, (48) can be written as
Since (48) can be written as
we see that z i ≤ z j if i ≥ j . Therefore, the matrix specified by z j defined in (48) is admissible.
In the remaining of this subsection, we will verify that for any (k, d, ) ∈ P s , f (Q) satisfies the conditions (43), (44) and (45), where Q is determined by (48). First, we need to write f (Q) explicitly. To do this, we divide the matrix Q into three regions, namely A, B and C as illustrated in Fig. 3. 1) For the shaded gray region A = {q x,y : x ≤ mz y , +1 ≤ y ≤ k}, we can easily see that q x,y = 0 and t x,y = .
Then by checking the conditions in (37), we see that only the elements in the first column, i.e. y = + 1, belong to the second case, while all others belong to the first case. Hence, the total contribution of the region A to f (Q) is given by
2) For the dotted area B = {q x,y : x > mz +1 , + 1 ≤ y ≤ k}, we can easily see that q x,y = 1 and t x,y = y − 1. Hence, we can obtain from (36) that the total contribution of the region B to f (Q) is given by
3) For the remaining region C = {q x,y : mz y < x ≤ mz +1 , + 1 ≤ y ≤ k}, we consider its contribution to f (Q) column by column. For the column j , let
, which is illustrated as the vertical stripe in Fig. 3 
Note that for a fixed j , C i j may be empty for some i . Focus on a non-empty C i j , which is illustrated as the crosshatched segment in Fig. 3 . Then we have q x,y = 1 and t x,y = + j − i − 1. By invoking (36), we obtain that the contribution of C i j to f (Q) is
It follows that the contribution of C j to f (Q) is given by
and the total contribution of the region C to f (Q) is given by
For the ease of notation in the remaining parts, let us first simplify (54). Consider
where (a) follows from replacing the indices p and j by j and i , respectively. Let
where (b) follows from c k = 0 by definition. Hence, (54) can be written as
Now, focus on f (Q), which can be obtained by adding (52), (53), and (55) as follows:
By dividing m on both sides, we have
For notational simplicity, let us separately discuss the case = k − 1. For = k − 1, (56) can be written as
where (c) follows from (49 , and we can easily check that these coefficients satisfy (43), (44) and (45), which implies that if = k − 1, then (k, d, ) ∈ P. This result has already been obtained in [18] and [19] , but the proof here is much shorter (if we confine our discussion to the case = k − 1). For ≤ k − 2, by collecting the terms in (56), we obtain
wherē
(59)
Recall that we need to check the three conditions (43), (44) and (45). First, let us check that (43) is satisfied as follows. From (50) and (51), we can see that in both cases, we have
Hence we obtain
where (d) follows from (48). Now, let us verify the conditions (44) and (45). From (58), we see thatμ ≥ 0 andμ k ≥ 0. Sinceδ k = (d + 1 − k)μ k , we haveδ k ≥ 0. Hence, it remains to show thatμ j ≥ 0 and δ j ≥ 0 for j = + 1, . . . , k − 1. We know from (59) that ν j ≥ 0 for all j , so we havē
which implies that ifδ j ≥ 0, thenμ j ≥ 0. Therefore, it suffices to prove the following proposition. Proof. See Appendix H.
C. Discussion
In this paper, we are interested in the problem of determining parameters whose optimal storage-bandwidth tradeoff curve has a single corner point. However, the approach proposed to solve the problem may also be helpful to the general problem, that is characterizing the tradeoff for any parameters (n, k, d, ) .
Recall that we upper bounded the secrecy capacity by a linear combination of random variables α, H (S [i] n ) and
where each configuration of Q (cf. (39)) gives a different upper bound on B s . Also, we know that the two entropies H (S
n ) and H (S j |S [ j −1] ) are related by the following inequality:
Since our purpose is to bound the secrecy capacity B s by some α, we found some configurations that give coefficients satisfying the conditions in (43), (44) and (45) n ) remain with positive coefficients. Then by the union bound, one can easily obtain an upper bound which is some linear combination of α and β and also a valid outer bound for the secrecy capacity region. This is indeed what we did to prove the first case in (62) for k,d, > d, i.e.,
To the best of our knowledge, for those parameters whose tradeoff may have multiple corner points, the cut-set bound is the best known outer bound in general, that is
One can easily check that the outer bound in (61) that we have obtained largely improves the cut-set bound in the region whereβ is small (the so-called bandwidth-limited region in [11] ).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study parameters (n, k, d, ) whose optimal storage-bandwidth tradeoff curve has one corner point and can be determined. Toward this end, we obtained a lower bound on the number of wiretap nodes which is tight for k = d = n − 1. Whether this bound is tight for other values of n, k and d is a problem for future research. Our results subsume all the previous related results [16] - [19] .
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THE OPTIMALITY OF (α,β)
We will prove that (α,β) is on the optimal tradeoff curve by establishing the following outer bound ᾱ
It has been shown thatβ ≥β (cf. (13) ). As illustrated in Fig. 4 , we can see that the intersection ofβ ≥β and (62) is given by  (α,β) , no matter whether k,d, > d or k,d, ≤ d. As (α,β) is achievable, we can conclude that (α,β) must be on the tradeoff curve if (62) holds. We now proceed to (62). By letting T = {S i : i = 1, . . . , k} and L = [] in (12) , we have 
where (c) follows from (27) 
which is equivalent tō
i.e. the first case of (62). When k,d, ≤ d, by multiplying (63) and (64) by d − k,d, and k,d, respectively, we have
which is equivalent toᾱ ≥α, i.e. the second case of (62). Therefore, we have proved (62).
Remark. Shao et al. [19] have proved thatᾱ ≥α if k,d, ≤ d, i.e. the second case of (62). The proof therein is very lengthy. The proof of (62) here is much simple, and the first case is a new result.
APPENDIX B CONSEQUENCES OF THEOREM 2 1) We first justify that there exists a lower bound on by proving the claim: if satisfies (11) then + 1 satisfies (11). Let 
Note that is well defined since (k, d, = k − 1) ∈ P s for any given k and d.
One can easily check that when k − 4 ≤ ≤ k − 2, the claim is true, so it remains to show that if (k, d, ) ∈ P s for < k − 4, then (k, d, + 1) ∈ P s . Towards this end, let Clearly (k, d, ) ∈ P s for ≤ k − 4 if and only if g() ≥ 0. For the quadratic equation g() = 0, the discriminant is 3(d − k) 2 + 12(d − 4) + (k −8) 2 , which is nonnegative provided that d ≥ 4. This condition is guaranteed because we have
where the second inequality follows from the range of in (66). Let 1 and 2 be two roots of g() = 0 such that 1 ≤ 2 . Since the leading coefficient of g() is negative, we see that g() ≥ 0 if and only if 1 ≤ ≤ 2 . Consider
Then, if g() ≥ 0 for some < k − 4, we have
which implies that g( + 1) ≥ 0, as is to be proved. 2) Second, We claim that Theorem 2 improves the existing result in Shao et al. [19] , where they showed that (k, d, ) ∈ P if
Let P r : =   (k, d, ) : ≥ * .
Recall that
Evidently, k,d, is decreasing with while d + √ d is increasing with , and so we have
We will justify our claim by first showing that P r ⊆ P s , or equivalently ≤ * . For fixed k and d, assume that (k, d, ) ∈ P r , and we will prove that (k, d, ) ∈ P s . One can easily check that it is true for ≥ k − 3, so we focus on the case ≤ k − 4. Let
. This can be substantiated by contradiction. Assume the contrary that ≤ 0 − 1. Then we have
where (a) follows from k ≥ + 4 and 1 2 (k − )(2d − k − + 1) is increasing with k when k ≤ d; (b) follows from the assumption ≤ 0 − 1, and (c) follows from 1 ≤ ≤ k −4 ≤ d −4. Clearly, (69) contradicts with the assumption that h () ≥ 0, and hence we know that if h() ≥ 0 for some ≤ k − 4, then ≥ 0 . Next, we will show that g() ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ ≤ k − 4. Consider
where (d) follows because 1 2 (2d − k − + 1)(2d + k − 3 − 5) is decreasing with k when k ≥ + 4, (e) follows from ≥ 0 , and (f) follows from 2 0 − d + 2 ≥ 1. Hence, we have shown that g() ≥ 0 if h() ≥ 0 for some ≤ k − 4. Therefore we can conclude that P r ⊆ P s , or ≤ * .
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 3
First, for t = 0, . . . , k − 2, we consider
where (71) The second term on the right-hand side of (71) can be further bounded as follows:
By re-arranging (75), we have
Hence, μ t ≥ 0 for t = 1, . . . , − 1 and so it remains to show that μ 0 ≥ 0. For = 1, this is trivial as μ 0 = 1. For ≥ 2, we claim that
To see this, we first separately discuss the cases = 2 and = 3, where μ t , t = 0, . . . , − 1 are as given as follows:
(79)
Then we can easily verify that (78) holds. For ≥ 4 and any j = 1, . . . , − 3, we have
where the above inequality and some other algebraic equalities in the sequel which are marked by an asterisk can be verified by symbolic computation application such as SageMath [23] . The steps are very lengthy and they are omitted here. By substituting j = − 3, we havê
Since μ −2 = 6(n − − 3) (n − + 1)(n − + 2) ,
and so
Therefore, we obtain
and n + 1 − 4 is an integer, we have n + 1 − 4 ≥ 0, and thus μ 0 ≥ 0 for ≥ 2.
B. Proof of Proposition 4
We need to prove that c t ≥ 0 for t = 0, . . . , − 1 and c −1 = 0 when ≥ 2. Recall that
First, we show that c −1 = 0 for ≥ 2 as follows:
For t = 0, it is easy to see that
as ≥ 2 implies that n ≥ 7, and we know from Proposition 3 that μ 0 ≥ 0. Clearly, the proposition is proved for = 2, and it remains to verify that c t ≥ 0 for t = 1, . . . , − 2 for ≥ 3. If = 3, we obtain from (80) that
which completes the proof for = 3.
For ≥ 4 and any t = 1, . . . , − 3, we have
It is easy to see that c t ≥ 0 for any t = 1, . . . ,−3 from (84). If t = − 2, we have
Hence, we obtain that c t ≥ 0, t = 1, . . . , − 2 for ≥ 4. In summary, for ≥ 2, we have
C. Proof of Proposition 5
We need to verify that λ t = c t −1 (d+1−t)−c t (d−t)−b t = 0 for t = 2, . . . , − 1 and ≥ 3. Recall that (85) and
If t = − 1, we have
If t = − 2 (implies that ≥ 4), we have
Therefore, we conclude that
D. Proof of Proposition 6
We first prove that T 2 ≥ 0 as follows:
and then we have T 2 ≥ 0 because = 1 4 (n − 2) ≥ 1 4 (n −2). Now, we focus on T 1 . For = 2, we have
, where (a) follows from (79). For = 3, we have
, where (a) follows from (80). For ≥ 4, we have
Therefore, for ≥ 2, we obtain
, and we can verify that
APPENDIX E PROOF OF LEMMA 4 From (74), we know that for t = 0, . . . , k − 2,
which completes the proof.
APPENDIX F PROOF OF LEMMA 5
We first prove (36). For any y = + 1, . . . , k and ≤ t y ≤ y − 1, consider and 2 ( j ) = (x, y) : q x,y = 0, t x,y = j + 1, y = j + 2 .
Here, 1 ( j ) is the set of all (x, y) that contributes to the coefficient of H (S [ j ] n ) via the second term in the upper bound in the second line of (37), and 2 ( j ) is the set of all (x, y) that contributes to the coefficient of H (S [ j ] n ) via the second term in the upper bound in the first line of (37). Since 1 ( j ) and 2 ( j ) are disjoint, for the row x, ν x, j is defined by ((x, y) ) + 1 2 ( j ) ((x, y) ) , and so we havē ((x, y) ) .
(98) Now, consider
First, focus on k j = (d + 1 − j )μ j . Then we have ((x, y) )
where (a) follows because for fixed x and y, 1 3 ( j ) ((x, y) ((x, y) ), ((x, y) ).
By examining the set ∪ j 1 ( j ), we have # j
Since − 1 ≤ t x,y ≤ k − 1 always holds, we have # j 1 ( j ) = (x, y) : q x,y = 1 , and hence
which is equivalent to
Similarly, for the sets ∪ j 2 ( j ) and ∪ j 3 ( j ), we have # Note that ∪ j 2 ( j ) = ∪ j 3 ( j ). By letting
we have 1 ((x, y) ). (103)
Hence, (100) can be written as ((x, y) ) y − 1 ((x, y) ) .
Now, focus on k j = k−1 i= jν i in (99), and we have ((x, y) ) ((x, y) )
where (b) follows because for fixed x and y, 1 1 ( j ) ((x, y)) = 1 only if y = j + 1 and 1 2 ( j ) ((x, y)) = 1 only if y = j + 2. Since 1 ( j ) ∩ 1 ( j ) = ∅ and 2 ( j ) ∩ 2 ( j ) = ∅ for j = j , we have k−1 j = 1 1 ( j ) ((x, y)) = 1 ∪ j 1 ( j ) ((x, y) ), and k−1 j = 1 2 ( j ) ((x, y)) = 1 ∪ j 2 ( j ) ((x, y) ).
By examining the sets ∪ j 1 ( j ) and ∪ j 2 ( j ), we have # j 1 ( j ) = (x, y) : q x,y = 0, t x,y = y − 1 , and # j 2 ( j )
= (x, y) : q x,y = 0, t x,y = y − 1, + 2 ≤ y ≤ k + 1 .
Since + 1 ≤ y ≤ k, ∪ j 2 ( j ) can be written as (x, y) : q x,y = 0, t x,y = y − 1, y = + 1 . Note that if y = + 1, then t x,y = = y − 1, so we know that t x,y = y − 1 implies that y = + 1. Hence, ∪ j 2 ( j ) can be written as # j 2 ( j ) = (x, y) : q x,y = 0, t x,y = y − 1 .
We can easily see that ∪ j 2 ( j ) = , where is defined in (102). By letting
we have k−1 j = 1 1 ( j ) ((x, y)) = 1 ∪ j 1 ( j ) ((x, y)) = 1 ((x, y) ).
Also, k−1 j = 1 2 ( j ) ((x, y)) = 1 ∪ j 2 ( j ) ((x, y)) = 1 ((x, y) ).
Hence, we obtain that (x, y) )) . 
